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NINTH CIRCUIT COURT 
OF APPEALS 
Geary v. Renne, 
_F.2d___, 89 D.A.R. 9407, 
No. 88-2875 (9th Cir., July 24, 1989). 
Ban On Party Endorsements In 
Nonpartisan Races Upheld 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has upheld a California constitutional 
amendment banning all party endorse-
ments in nonpartisan races, which in-
cludes judgeships, school boards, county 
supervisors, and city councils. 
The ban was added to the California 
Constitution, Article II, section 6(b), in 
1986, in a constitutional amendment pro-
posed by the legislature. The measure 
was prompted by an earlier California 
Supreme Court decision permitting Re-
publican party opposition to the con-
firmation vote on three then-Justices of 
the Supreme Court. The provision was 
supported by organizations representing 
judges, city councils, county supervisors, 
and school boards, and opposed by the 
major political parties and California 
Common Cause. Suit was filed by Demo-
cratic Party activists in San Francisco 
against the City Attorney, who began 
deleting party endorsements of local can-
didates from the voter pamphlet. 
In an opinion by Judges Trott and 
Sneed, the court held that although the 
ban is a substantial limitation on first 
amendment rights and therefore suspect 
and subject to strict judicial scrutiny, 
the ban is narrowly tailored to meet the 
state's compelling interest in ensuring 
that political parties do not have an 
undue influence on candidates or voters 
in nonpartisan races. The court, taking 
special note of an amicus brief filed by 
Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, cited 
the historical basis for nonpartisan elec-
tions stemming from corrupt political 
machines at the turn of the century, and 
the need to encourage and protect "inde-
pendent-minded persons who refuse to 
toe the party line." The court made 
several specific references to the per-
ceived need to ensure no political in-
fluence in judicial confirmation elections, 
"to avoid control over [judges1 fate by 
political parties." 
Judge Canby dissented, noting that 
the ban is a direct attempt to suppress 
information-the preference of a political 
party-precisely because the voters might 
listen to it and act upon it. The threat to 
judicial independence, he would have 
held, is due to the fact of the election, 
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not to any endorsements. 
The decision is another in a series of 
challenges to California endorsement 
bans. In February, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that California could not 
constitutionally ban endorsements by 
county central committees of candidates 
within a party's primary elections. Eu v. 
San Francisco County Democratic Cen-
tral Commiltee, _U.S.__, 109 S.Ct. 
1013 (1989). (See CRLR Vol. 9, No. 2 
(Spring 1989) p. 125 for details.) 
Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 
_F.Zd___, 89 D.A.R. 8880, 
No. 86-3833 (9th Cir., July 10, 1989). 
A11orneys' Fee Enhancement For 
Risk of Loss 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has approved the use of a multiplier of 
1.33 in an antitrust action to compensate 
prevailing plaintiffs for the risk of loss. 
The underlying action was an anti-
trust case which went through two jury 
trials, one appellate opinion, and a peti-
tion for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, resulting in an eventual award of 
$1,349,700 in treble damages. Fees were 
sought, and the undisputed lodestar 
amount of $1,284,896 was enhanced by 
one-third solely because of the uncer-
tainty of ever recovering a fee. 
On appeal the enhancement was up-
held, even under the tests in Pennsyl-
vania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Coun-
cil for Clean Air (Delaware Valley II), 
483 U.S. 711 (1987). In that case, the 
Supreme Court prohibited enhancements 
to fees based on uncertainty and contin-
gency of recovery, unless the plaintiff 
faced substantial difficulties in finding 
counsel for the case in the local market 
and the multiplier sought is related to 
contingent fee cases as a class, not to 
the difficulty of the particular case. In 
the instant case, the district court cited 
testimony about the peculiar difficulties 
in obtaining counsel in antitrust cases, 
and that no law firm would take the 
cases if the recovery in fees was no more 
than that available for work compensated 
on a noncontingent basis for hourly 
work. However, the court did reduce 
the award to eliminate any enhancement 
for hours spent on the fee request itself, 
since the risks of nonrecovery were pre-
sumably diminished. 
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UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURTS 
United States ex rel. 
Truong v. Northrop Corp., 
_F. Supp.__, 
No. CV 88-967-MRP (Aug. 11, 1989). 
Court Upholds Whistleblower lAw 
In the third case in as many months, 
a district court has upheld the constitu-
tionality of a law that allows private 
citizens to sue government contractors 
for fraud against the government. 
At issue was the False Claims Act, 
31 U.S.C. section 3730, which permits a 
plaintiff to bring a "qui tam" action 
against a government contractor, regard-
less of whether the individual has suf-
fered any personal damages. The case 
must be filed under seal, and the Depart-
ment of Justice has sixty days to decide 
whether to pursue the case itself or allow 
the private party to prosecute it. In either 
case, the private party is entitled to a 
share of the eventual proceeds. The law 
was originally passed in 1863 in the 
wake of Civil War scandals in procure-
ment. It was little used thereafter, and 
extensively amended in 1986, principally 
to enlarge the qui tam provisions. It 
applies to all federal government con-
tractors, although its origin and most 
cases involve military contracts. 
This action was filed by three former 
Northrop employees, alleging fraudulent 
billing in the B-2 bomber program by 
Northrop. Northrop sought dismissal on 
grounds that the qui tam provisions vio-
lated the federal constitution's separation 
of powers and appointments clauses, and 
because the plaintiffs lacked standing. 
U.S. District Court Judge Marianna 
Pfaelzer rejected all three arguments, 
holding that there is no constitutional 
infirmity in the qui tam provision, be-
cause the act is not a "subterfuge" for 
congressional control and therefore does 
not interfere with the executive branch 
responsibility to enforce the laws. On 
the standing claim, the court held the 
law does not violate the Article II re-
quirement of a "case or controversy", in 
that the government had a "very clear 
demonstration of injury", and the plain-
tiff had a "personal stake in the litiga-
tion", both of which assured the "under-
lying purpose of Article Ill which .. .is to 
ensure the genuine adversariness of liti-
gation." 
The opinion accords with two recent 
decisions rejecting nearly identical attacks 
on the False Claims Act, in United States 
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ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopter, 87 
D.A.R. 7687, No. CV 87-1840-WDK 
(C.D.Cal., June I, 1989) (see CRLR 
Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989) p. 131), 
and United States ex rel. Newsham v. 
Lockheed Missiles & Space, No. C88-
20009-RPA (N.D.Cal., June 1989). 
CALIFORNIA 
SUPREME COURT 
McHugh v. Santa Monica 
Rent Control Board, 
_Cal. 3d_, No. L.A. 32062, 
89 D.A.R. 10519 (Aug. 17, 1989). 
Administrative Agency May Adjudicate 
Rents But Not Impose Penalties 
The California Supreme Court has 
held that the Santa Monica Rent Control 
Board may constitutionally act as an 
adjudicatory body to establish rents and 
resolve disputes between tenants and land-
lords, but the Board may not impose 
treble damages or permit immediate rent 
withholding without opportunity for ju-
dicial review. 
The Santa Monica Rent Control 
Board is empowered to promulgate rent 
regulations, including rent controls, and 
hear and determine complaints regarding 
those regulations. The relevant ordinance 
imposes on a landlord who violates the 
law a penalty of either $500 or three 
times the excess rent collected. That 
ordinance permits the dispute to be ad-
judicated by way of a civil action or in 
an adjudicatory hearing before the Board, 
which has the power to permit the pen-
alty to be deducted from future rent 
payments. Review of the latter may be 
had by writ of administrative mandamus 
under Code of Civil Procedure section 
1094.5. 
Plaintiff was charged with collecting 
illegal rents from tenants. Following hear-
ing, the Board found that the rents were 
excessive, and ruled the tenants were 
entitled to recovery of the excess multi-
plied by three, plus various costs and 
interest. Plaintiff filed a petition for a 
writ, alleging that the adjudication vio-
lated the California constitutional delega-
tion of judicial powers solely to the 
judiciary. The writ was granted, and the 
court issued an injunction preventing 
enforcement of any portion of the com-
plaint provision of the rent control law. 
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The Supreme Court, per Chief Justice 
Lucas joined by Justices Mosk, Eagleson, 
Kaufman, and Arguelles, treated the issue 
as one of first impression, explicitly 
declining to follow prior precedent on 
whether administrative agencies may ex-
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ercise judicial powers as lacking in 
explanatory basis and out of step with 
an intervening fifty years of decisional 
law. The court canvassed an exhaustive 
review of decisions from California and 
other states on the issue, and announced 
a new rule. The court created a two-part 
test for constitutional adjudications by 
an agency, including those involving li-
censes, revocations, and restitutionary 
monetary remedies: (I) the adjudication 
activities must be authorized by statute 
and necessary to effectuate the agency's 
primary regulatory purposes; and (2) the 
"essential" judicial power (the power to 
make enforceable, binding judgments) 
remains ultimately with the courts, 
through judicial review. 
Using this test, the court held that 
the Board could adjudicate the proper 
level of rent and order restitution of the 
excess. However, the court also held 
that the Board could not authorize the 
tenant to immediately withhold the 
amount awarded as restitution, for to 
do so would effectively preclude any 
judicial review: the tenant could with-
hold instantly, and use the order as a 
defense to an unlawful detainer action, 
and effectively recoup the entire sum 
before a section 1094.5 action could be 
filed and prosecuted. As an alternative, 
an order to take effect after thirty days, 
to allow for judicial review, was held 
permissible. 
The court also summarily struck the 
treble damages authority as "arbitrary", 
and rejected a claim that a landlord had 
a right to a jury trial. 
Justices Panelli and Eagleson concur-
red to explain that the decision would 
not permit "an agency to award substan-
tial general compensatory damages" even 
if this would further the agency's pur-
pose. Justice Broussard concurred and 
dissented, and would have upheld the 
treble damages remedy, and the power 
to order immediate relief. 
California Common Cause v. 
Supervisors, 
_Cal. 3d__, 89 D.A.R. 10803, 
No. S00l833 (Aug. 24, 1989). 
County Not Required to Deputize 
Employees To Conduct 
Voter Registration 
The Supreme Court has ruled that a 
county is not required to deputize em-
ployees to act as registrars to register 
voters in county offices. 
Plaintiffs originally filed smt m su-
perior court in Los Angeles to force the 
county to implement a voter registration 
plan by deputizing county employees 
who have frequent contact with minoritv 
and low-income citizens to increase their 
registration. Plaintiffs provided statistical 
data to show underregistration and un-
derrepresentation in voting by these popu-
lations, with studies showing the dispar-
ate effect of registration requirements 
on these groups. The county contended 
that education and age were more likely 
important factors than race or income. 
The trial court granted a preliminary 
injunction, compelling the county to cre-
ate a program deputizing county workers 
who have frequent contact with low-
income and minority citizens. The in-
junction was designed both to force com-
pliance with the requirements of Elec-
tions Code sections 302 and 304, which 
provide for deputization of registrars 
and require the Secretary of State to 
formulate regulations for voter outreach 
programs, and as a remedy for other 
violations of the Elections Code. The 
court of appeal affirmed. 
The Supreme Court, per Justices 
Lucas, Panelli, Eagleson, Kaufman, and 
Arguelles, reversed. The court relied on 
technical rules for writs of mandate to 
hold that there is_no mandatory duty to 
achieve maximum voter registration or 
to use a particular means, only a general 
directive leaving the methods of achiev-
ing such a goal to the county's discretion, 
and therefore no writ could issue. The 
court also held that, whether or not the 
county had violated other provisions of 
the Elections Code, the appropriate ac-
tion for a court was to order compliance, 
not to fashion creative remedies. 
Justice Broussard, with Justice Mosk, 
dissented and would have held that, given 
that the right to vote is fundamental, 
any burdens on that right are subject to 
strictest judicial scrutiny. Because plain-
tiffs had established that preregistration 
requirements disproportionately disen-
franchised certain groups such as minori-
ties and the poor, and because the legis-
lature has imposed upon counties the 
duty to ensure the highest possible regis-
tration, Justice Broussard would have 
affirmed the lower court. 
Center for Public Interest Law v. 
Fair Political Practices Commission, 
No. S007758 (Aug. 17, 1989). 
Court Declines to Review 
Proposition 68 Case 
The Supreme Court has declined to 
review the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal holding that Proposi-
tion 73's ban on public funding of cam-
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 9 No 4 (F II 1' 9) 
paigns voids Proposition 68's creation 
of a Campaign Reform Fund. (See CRLR 
Vol. 9, No. 3 (Summer 1989) p. 132 and 
Vol. 9, No. I (Winter 1989) pp. 111-12 
for background information.) 
CALIFORNIA COURTS 
OF APPEAL 
Taxpayers to Limit Campaign 
Spending v. Fair Political 
Practices Commission, 
_Cal. App. 3d~ 89 D.A.R. 9345, 
No. B039177 (Aug. I, 1989). 
Portions of Proposition 68 Upheld 
and Harmonized With 
Proposition 73 
In the latest in a series of decisions 
by courts and others attempting to recon-
cile Propositions 68 and 73, the Second 
District Court of Appeal is the first to 
hold that Proposition 73 does not entire-
ly void Proposition 68, and therefore 
large portions of Proposition 68 may 
take effect. 
Propositions 68 and 73 both were 
passed by the voters at the June 1988 
election. (For a full description of each, 
see CRLR Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 1988) 
p. 1.) Proposition 68 was placed on the 
ballot by a coalition of good government 
and business groups, and applies only to 
legislative offices. Proposition 73 was 
placed on the ballot by a coalition of 
three incumbent legislators and applies 
to legislative, statewide, and local elec-
tions. Proposition 73 received a higher 
affirmative vote; thus, both must be im-
plemented, but Proposition 73 takes prece-
dence over Proposition 68 in areas of 
irreconcilable conflict. The FPPC opined 
that most of Proposition 68 conflicted 
with Proposition 73; the remainder of 
Proposition 68 was not severable; and 
therefore none of Proposition 68 could 
take effect. The principal sponsor of 
Proposition 68 sought a writ of mandate 
directly in the court of appeal to review 
that decision. 
A unanimous court, per Justices Cros-
key, Klein, and Arabian, issued the writ. 
In a lengthy opinion that reviews every 
part of both propositions, the court held 
that principles of statutory interpretation 
require that the two initiatives be recon-
ciled if at all possible, with the goal of 
preserving all parts of Proposition 68 
not directly and immediately in conflict 
with Proposition 73. The court rejected 
a "thematic approach" urged by Proposi-
tion 73 supporters as essentially a politi-
cal analysis, not a legal one. The court 
specifically rejected the Proposition 73 
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supporters' argument, which was also 
the basis of their campaign, that the 
voters were choosing between Proposi-
tions 68 and 73-holding instead that 
the intent of the voters was clearly to 
enact both propositions and the judicial 
task is to find a way to preserve that 
intent. Only specific provisions of Propo-
sition 68 which are in direct conflict and 
irreconcilable with Proposition 73 may 
not take effect. This requires a section 
by section analysis and an effort to har-
monize. 
Using this section by section analysis, 
the court upheld all of the following 
provisions of Proposition 68: a ban on 
contributions during non-election years; 
limitations on total or aggregate contri-
butions by a contributor; calculations 
and limitations on aggregating group 
and family contributions; regulations on 
return of contributions; regulation of 
loans; regulations of the timing of contri-
butions in primary and general elections; 
and amendments to the criminal penal-
ties for violations. A writ issued to require 
the FPPC to enforce these provisions. 
The court made its order effective pros-
pectively only. 
AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian, 
_Cal. App. 3d~ 89 D.A.R. 9345, 
No. C002364 (July 20, 1989). 
Governor Required to List All 
Carcinogens Under Proposition 65 
The Third District Court of Appeal 
affirmed a trial court order requiring 
the Governor to include on the list of 
chemicals required by Proposition 65 all 
chemicals shown to cause cancer in ani-
mals; the list is not limited to human 
carcinogens only. 
Proposition 65, passed at the Novem-
ber 1986 general election, requires the 
Governor to publish a list of chemicals 
"known to the state of California to 
cause cancer." The first list was required 
on March I, 1987, to include at a mini-
mum certain specified chemicals that are 
listed as human and animal carcinogens 
by national and international agencies. 
The list is to be supplemented by the 
Governor periodically. Following listing, 
businesses using those chemicals must 
provide warnings to workers and con-
sumers of any exposure. The Governor 
refused to list, all of the referenced 
chemicals, and limited the initial list to 
known human carcinogens only. This 
became known as the "short list", and 
included approximately 10% of all the 
chemicals referenced by the statute. At-
torney General John Van de Kamp ad-
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vised the Governor that his action was 
contrary to the law, and refused to 
defend the action when suit was filed by 
labor and environmental groups. (For 
complete background information, see 
CRLR Vol. 7, No. 3 (Summer 1987) p. 
138 and Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 1987) pp. 
15-16.) 
The Sacramento County Superior 
Court overruled a demurrer filed by the 
Governor, and issued a preliminary in-
junction compelling inclusion of all the 
chemicals on the list. On appeal, the 
appellate court affirmed in a unanimous 
opinion by Justices Puglia, Sparks, and 
Marie:. The court held that Health and 
Safety Code section 25249.8, which cre-
ated the list, specifically requires in-
clusion of substances referenced in Labor 
Code section 6382. That statute requires 
Cal-OSHA to publish a list including all 
carcinogens, human and animal, as deter-
mined by the International Agency for 
Research on Cancer and the National 
Toxicology Program. The court rejected 
the Governor's argument that although 
the statute specifically referenced these 
lists, he had discretion to exclude any 
chemicals. The court held instead that, 
at least as to the initial list, the listing 
was a purely ministerial act not subject 
to discretion. The immediate impact of 
the decision is limited, as the Governor-
acting on the advice of the statutorily 
mandated Scientific Advisory Panel-
has added most of the substances since 
March I, 1987. 
Sokolow v. County of San Mateo, 
_Cal. App. 3d~ 89 D.A.R. 10540, 
No. A039117 (Aug. 17, 1989). 
Plaintiff Entitled to Attorneys' Fees 
For Partial Success 
The First District Court of Appeal 
has held that a plaintiff in a civil rights 
suit is entitled to attorneys' fees even 
though the lawsuit did not achieve all of 
plaintif rs goals. 
Plaintiff in the underlying suit chal-
lenged the male-only policy of the Mount-
ed Patrol of San Mateo County. The 
Patrol was affiliated with the county 
sheriff, consisting of unsworn volunteers. 
They were deputized by the Sheriff, per-
formed tasks for and were trained by 
the Sheriff, wore uniforms and insignia 
identifying them as deputies, and acted 
as deputies under color of Jaw. Only 
men were allowed to join. Plaintiff, a 
woman, sought admission; she was de-
nied, and sued under federal and state 
theories. The suit sought to permit her 
entry or, in the alternative, to sever all 
141 
142 
ties between the county and the Patrol. 
Judgment in her favor was entered. The 
Patrol chose to sever all ties, and both it 
and the county ended all ties and refer-
ences. No appeal was filed. 
On application for attorneys' fees, 
the court denied fees, finding that plain-
tiff was not a prevailing party in that 
she had neither gained admission for 
herself nor any one else. On appeal, the 
court, per Justices Merrill, White, and 
Barry-Deal, reversed. The court held that 
plaintiff was unquestionably the prevail-
ing party and so was entitled to fees and 
costs. However, the court also held that 
the award may be limited where the 
success is less than complete, and relied 
on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 
( 1983), interpreting awards under federal 
law. The court grafted a similar limita-
tion on state attorneys' fee law under 
Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. 
Although the court made no specific 
finding in this particular case, the court 
did emphasize that the inquiry on re-
mand should not be a parsing to deter-
mine which particular causes of action 
or legal theories prevailed, but rather 
attention must be paid to the actual 
results sought and those achieved. 
SUPERIOR COURTS 
People v. Jenkins, 
No. 89-M-213 (Lassen County 
Justice Court). 
First Criminal Prosecution/or 
Violating Open Meeting Laws 
In the first known case of its kind, a 
criminal complaint was filed on April 
28, 1989, against a local entity for vio-
lating the Ralph M. Brown Act, Govern-
ment Code section 54950 et seq., the 
California open meetings law applicable 
to local governments. The case was filed 
by the Lassen County District Attorney 
in Susanville against the Lassen County 
Board of Supervisors for holding an 
alleged illegal meeting on September 27, 
1988, and unlawfully "taking action," as 
that term is used in the Brown Act. The 
Brown Act was amended recently to 
allow for civil actions, which are fre-
quently brought by news organizations 
and private citizens. 
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